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Abstract
In this paper we consider a number of issues
concerned with how creativity can exist within a
paradigm of computational search. We look both
at creativity within the search process and the ca-
pacity of the search space to facilitate creativity.
Within the latter we consider notions of compress-
ibility and openness in search spaces; the influence
of modularity and substructures on creativity; and
the distinction between items in a search space de-
noting an external reference versus connoting links
within and beyond the search space. We go on to
discuss whether there really is a true distinction be-
tween transformational and exploratory notions of
creativity within the context of search. Finally we
offer some open questions in this area.
1 Overview
The tensions between search and creativity is important in
understanding the extent to which machine creativity is pos-
sible. The aim of this paper is to clarify a number of issues
and raise a number of questions concerning this. In the first
substantive section of the paper we give an overview of the
connections and conflicts between these two notions. We then
consider several issues concerning the structure of the search
space, centred around a notion of openness and the extent to
which such a notion is similar to and different from ideas of
finiteness, structuredness and compressibility. We move on
to consider the idea that many aspects of creativity in search
may be linked to the idea of points in the search space being
treated in a connotative fashion by contrast to the denotative
style associated with traditional search. Finally we consider
the well-known notions of exploratory and transformational
creativity in the light of this discussion.
2 Introduction
2.1 The search stance in AI
A common stance in AI research is that of casting various
problems associated with the action of mind as search prob-
lems. That is, we assert that the problem at hand “might as
well be” a problem of searching some space.
This can be seen as an aspect of the functionalist stance
in understanding mind. The core aspect of functionalism is
a substrate-agnosticism which hypothesises that the phenom-
ena that we term “mind” are capable of being realised equally
well on any substrate that has sufficient computational rich-
ness. A second aspect of functionalism, which will be im-
portant in this paper, is a kind of quasi-behaviourist process-
agnosticism, viz. that we can ascribe (an aspect of) mind to
any process that produces similar1 outputs/behaviour from
similar inputs/environment. The details of the process that
produces those outputs is considered irrelevant. Hence the
stance of approaching mentality as a computational search
problem: regardless of the actual process taken by human
minds, we can explain the important features as a search prob-
lem.
There are a number of reasons why we might want to make
this replacement/simplification. Firstly, we might be inter-
ested in pragmatic AI, i.e. producing mind-like phenomena
for some practical purpose. In these cases the process is irrel-
evant; as long as we can achieve the results, it doesn’t matter
how we get there. Secondly, we might be interested in un-
derstanding the actions of the human mind. In this case the
abstraction of mentality to a search process needs to be ar-
gued more carefully. For example we might validly make
arguments that are based solely on the structure of the input-
output map, and use the search model as a mapping between
these, purely because it is the easiest way to make the expla-
nation, whilst accepting that any other equivalent process of
producing that map is valid. Nonetheless it seems that we
must be more careful with this process-agnosticism than we
should be with substrate-agnosticism.
For the remainder of this paper we shall take it as a pre-
miss that relevant aspects of mind can be reproduced with all
essential features intact as a search process.
This model works well as an explanation of many men-
tal phenomena. For example we can model simple decision-
making processes such as finding a route around a building
or choosing what to eat for lunch as a process of reducing
the state space (deterministically or stochastically) of possi-
ble routes/lunches until we are left with a single point.
1the details of what is meant by “similar” are rather obscure,
particular when we start to consider creative processes.
2.2 Search and creativity
Nonetheless, when it comes to providing an explanation for
creative mental processes this notion of search breaks down
somewhat. Indeed there seems to be a tension between the
two notions of “search” and “creativity”.
There are a number of different concepts wrapped up in the
idea of machine creativity. The first of these is that of compu-
tational support for human creativity, for example in systems
that use human feedback to guide the direction of a search
process. This is not what concerns us here, and we shall not
pay any further attention to this in this paper. The second is
the idea of “pure” creativity, the creation of new things which
in some way go beyond simple variations of what is currently
known. This will be the main focus of this paper. A third
notion is that of creatively responding to some external stim-
ulus, i.e. using that stimulus as an inspiration for a creative
act. This has been less well studied in the world of machine
creativity, and whilst deserving of attention will not be the
focus here.
3 Creativity in the search process
Typically we talk about “being creative”; that is, we suggest
that it is the process that is where the creativity happens. One
of the arguments in this paper is that search-based creative
processes depend on the structure of the search space as well
as the search process. Nonetheless we shall begin with a brief
discussion of creative search processes.
One characteristic of creative search processes is that the
criteria for evaluation of where to make the moves in the
search space are not easy to capture in rulebound form. Con-
sider for example searching a space of melodies for “interest-
ing” or “tuneful” melodies. Whilst we might be able to sug-
gest a number of heuristics which might happen (for a while)
to generate such melodies, such heuristics will eventually run
out of steam. To continue to generate new melodies, we need
to be generating new heuristics.
One approach to creativity has been to create meta-level
heuristics which evaluate potential search moves in terms
of general characteristics of interesting results. This has
been used for example in systems such as AM (Davis and
Lenat, 1982) and HR (Colton et al., 2000; Colton, 2002) that
search for “interesting” patterns of numbers. For example
in Colton’s HR one way of assessing the interestingness of
mathematical conjectures is to ascertain whether the conjec-
ture makes use of concepts that do not otherwise appear to-
gether in other conjectures—viz. that the concept is surpris-
ing. A number of similar ideas have been explored in the data
mining literature (see (Freitas, 1999) for a survey), for ex-
ample assessing the interestingness of a rule that summarizes
data by looking both at its performance on the dataset and its
similarity to a database of rules/expert system that represent
“common knowledge”.
Another approach is search strategies that are driven by
diversity rather than optimisation (Johnson, 2001b). An ex-
ample of this is work on diversity-driven genetic algorithms
(Johnson, 2001a), which use a kind of tabu search where the
tabu list is not simply as a record of where the algorithm has
visited previously, but where it has visited and found items
in the search space which are similar to items that have al-
ready been found. Thus the algorithm is driven on to con-
stantly explore areas of the search space by negative pressure
against returning to well-explored areas, rather than by a pos-
itive pressure to find a particular goal.
4 Spaces that facilitate creative search
We turn now aspects of the search space rather than process;
how can wemore carefully characterise the seeming openness
of creative search?
One characteristic of open search spaces is that they have
some complexity which belies “easy” search, as exemplified
by exploration of the space of designs for mechanical devices
or electrical circuits. Even though an exhaustive search would
turn up the same result as a “creative” search, both the size
of the search space and the complex structure thereof. For
example it is not possible for a “naive” thinker to conceive of
how to specify and order the “all possible” designs.
Another is because the search space is seen as being exten-
sible. Boden (1990; 1998) (see also (Wiggins, 2001, 2003)
for an elaboration and formalization of these ideas) has made
a distinction between transformational and exploratory no-
tions of creativity. Exploratory creativity consists of ex-
ploring an existing set of possibilities in a creative fashion;
whereas transformational creativity consists of transforming
the space that is explored.
As an example of this consider the idea of searching a
space of melodies as discussed above. In order to search this
space, we will need to give a description of what a “melody”
is—e.g. a sequence of notes in a particular key. However this
definition has limitations: what about a melody that changes
key half way through? So we expand the search space to
include such melodies, then . . . . The search space can (seem-
ingly) always be extended.
5 Is this just about finite vs. infinite spaces?
This appears to be a more subtle distinction than merely say-
ing that openness is just exploring infinite spaces. Plenty
of infinite spaces are not open in this sense: a traditional
optimization problem (e.g. maximizing a function defined
over all integers) requires the exploration of an infinite search
space; however this is not an open, creative process. How-
ever the exploration of a finite space can sometimes have this
character of creative openness. For example the space of all
melodies consisting of a certain number of notes, or all sen-
tences of a certain length drawn from a finite dictionary are
both finite processes: nonetheless there is considerable scope
for creative search in both of these spaces.
6 Size and structure of search space
What, then, characterises search spaces that are ripe for cre-
ative exploration?
Perhaps in some cases this is just a matter of performance
of search relative to human cognitive capacity to perform the
creative act. It has been suggested (Miller et al., 2002) that
the creation of complex circuits is a creative act (though this
does have a definite problem solving outcome). However this
may just be a human-parochial point of view. If we were able
to explore circuit space much more rapidly in our minds, then
perhaps the creative aspect of this would diminish. A related
example is that in a typical function optimization problem we
do not see the algorithm as being creative: is this because we
are (at least theoretically) able to “step back” from the func-
tion and “see” the optimum, so finding the optimum doesn’t
seem a creative act?
6.1 Structure of the search space: compressibility
One idea is to explore connections with information-theoretic
notions of compressibility. Non-open search spaces admit a
simple description, both in terms of describing the space and
describing the effect of members of the space on the “fitness”
of that member of the space. For example in the optimization
problem each member of the search space translates into a
value of the function being optimized: there is nothing rich
about the structure of the fitness space, even for a complex
function.
However for an open space the space generated by the
translation of the search space values into “fitness” space has
a richness redolent of incompressibility in information the-
ory. We are not surprised to find areas of this space which
are unlike any other areas in the space, and the structure of
such space is typically complex, with regions of very differ-
ent sizes and shapes having particular qualitative characters.
6.2 Structure of the search space: modularity
Another idea is that spaces that are open for creative search
have an implicit modularity in their structure, and that
exploratory creativity consists not just of finding interest-
ing/surprising/whatever points in the space, but in discover-
ing how to exploit the modular building blocks in the space
in an intelligent way.
For example one reason that we may ascribe creativity to
the process of circuit design is that we see this as a process
of breaking down a big problem into subproblems, and work-
ing out how those subproblems fit together, and then tackling
those subproblems; as we go though this process we also ac-
quire knowledge about common subproblems and solutions
thereto, so we accumulate a knowledge-base about the prob-
lem. Is it this richness that we term “creativity” in these kinds
of problems, as opposed to e.g. a function optimization prob-
lem, which seems just to have one level of structure?
Similarly with a more open-ended creative process like
writing melodies there is a search space that has a rich struc-
ture, in particular there is a rich structure of different kinds of
similarities between melodies. One melody might have a sim-
ilar overall arc to others; it might have a similarities in terms
of its patterns of tension and release to others; it might con-
clude in ways that are similar to others. This contrasts with
the way in which items in the search space of a traditional
non-creative search space such as combinatorial or function
optimization have a single measure of distance, e.g. in opti-
mizing a function the difference between the fitness measure
of the two items.
6.3 Structure of the search space: connotation
Another, related, aspect of a search space where creative
search can occur is that there are many connotations between
items in the search space. Whilst only one search space item
might be presented as the end result of the creative process,
the rich structure of the search space means that the person
presented with that item is reminded of many other items in
the search space.
An example of this is in the process of distillation that
occurs in many kinds of artistic creativity 2. In such a pro-
cess the artist works with a set of materials, producing pro-
totype works and then discarding and reducing down aspects
of those prototypes, producing simpler pieces which are then
combined and elaborated again before being reduced again.
The end result of this process can be a simple item or ges-
ture. Nonetheless such distilled works can be very powerful
to the audience, and will be considered to be works of great
creativity, despite their simplicity. This may be because the
distillation process is very good at picking out points in the
search space that connote many other points; or it may be
that the audience can (intuitively) perceive that there is not a
straightforward route through the search space to the discov-
ery of such a simple item.
Much of the discussion in this section can be summarised
by the distinction between denotation and connotation. In
a traditional AI search processes, evaluation of the moves
through the search space is purely based on what the item
denotes. Perhaps in (some kinds of) creative search processes
the search is driven primarily by what each item in the search
space connotes. What might a fitness function based on this
notion of connotation look like?
7 Is there really a difference between
exploratory and transformational
creativity?
In this final section we explore two challenges that attempt to
undermine the traditional difference between exploratory and
transformational creativity.
7.1 Constraints on transformation and grades of
possibility
The first is the simple assertion that all creativity takes place
within a system that is subject to some constraints. For exam-
ple all human creative actions-in-the-world take place within
the “search space” of all possible physical actions. We can
conceive of many creative actions which are not realizable
due to the physical constraints of the real world, many of
which are artistically appealing.
This suggests that there can be limits to the scope of the
possibility of the transformation in an act of transformational
creativity. Yet perhaps this is not a problem. Perhaps it is
not necessary to have all possible transformations available in
order to validly have a theory of transformational creativity;
indeed what is the scope of “all possible” search spaces that
a transformation of search space could take us to?
2Many thanks to Michael Finnissy for discussions on this topic
Can we really meaningfully comprehend the space of “all
physically possible actions” as a search space, or have we
reached a stage by this point where being able to imagine ac-
tually searching this space is impossible, so the usefulness of
the search space analogy breaks down? This has been noted
by Dennett (1991): “sometimes an impossibility in fact is the-
oretically more interesting than a possibility in principle”.
All creative action can be seen as the exploration of pos-
sibilities. Can we learn anything, therefore, from theories of
possibility such as Dennett’s (1995) theory of grades of pos-
sibility? This theory suggests that possibilities can be placed
in a hierarchy. The original hierarchy is this: actual, histor-
ical, biological, physical and logical; additional intermediate
levels can be introduced. The idea is that any possible ac-
tion or object in the world can be placed at one of these lev-
els: the action/object being impossible at lower levels and the
higher levels being unnecessary. As an example Dennett dis-
cusses the notion of a flying horse: this is physically possible
in some form; however it is biologically impossible due to
constraints of energy expenditure, bone strength, et cetera. A
carnivorous horse, however, is biologically possible; it is just
not historically possible, as horse populations never found
themselves in a situation where meat-eating was necessary
or advantageous.
We can see all creative actions (which are realised in the
world) as being manipulations of levels of possibilities be-
tween the physical and the actual. Thus we can view this
either as a transformational process (when we make a trans-
formation in search space we are moving “upwards” in this
hierarchy) or explorational (whatever we are doing, we are
just messing around in the space of physically realizable pos-
sibilities).
7.2 Transformation within exploration via
substructure-building
A second challenge to the distinction between exploratory
and transformational creativity comes from search spaces
with the capacity for building substructures, as discussed ear-
lier. Such a space would traditionally be seen as offering
scope for exploratory creativity. However, when such sub-
structures are capable of being built, perhaps a kind of trans-
formational creativity is possible. Is building a vocabulary
and grammar of substructures within a large search space
more transformational than a pedestrian transformation of a
trivial search space?
8 Questions
We end with a few unresolved and open questions.
• What sorts of search processes and search spaces are
amenable to creativity?
• Are there kinds of creativity that cannot be understood
from within the search paradigm?
• Is the process-agnosticism of the search stance always
justified?
• Is the distinction between transformational and ex-
ploratory theories of creativity always justifiable?
• Should we pay more attention to the differences between
sizes of search spaces when we are explaining things us-
ing the search stance?
• Is the paradigm of moves based on evaluation of search-
space members always the best way to understand the
exploration of search spaces?
• What role does modularity and substructure-capacity of
search spaces play in this?
• What would a search based on connotation rather than
denotation look like?
• Can we formalise some of these arguments, e.g. using
the framework of Wiggins (2001; 2003).
• How many of these distinctions are just limits on the
ideas and analogies that we have for explaining creativ-
ity?
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